Fall 1952 • Vol. XIV No. 4 Nonfiction |

Philosophy in England¹

To a visiting American one of the most striking things about English philosophy today is the complete triumph of the analytic movement associated with the names of G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and the late Ludwig Wittgenstein. As I shall try to explain later, the differences within this movement are great enough to make it extremely difficult to present a doctrinal platform to which these great philosophers and their followers would subscribe. In the circumstances we may adopt the attitude of a historian of ideas, and not be too nervous about neglecting certain very important disagreements. One of the first things we notice is how hostile to speculative metaphysics English philosophers have become, and how often they insist that philosophy is not a rival of ordinary language and science, but rather an activity intended to clarify both. We can hardly fail to observe how little concerned they are with advancing a moral philosophy, but at the same time we must notice their preocc

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